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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
Paul Bergrin, a former federal prosecutor and 
prominent defense attorney, was indicted in the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey on numerous 
charges, including violations of the Racketeering Influenced 
and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”).  Reasoning that the 
RICO charges were inappropriate in light of “the disparate 
nature of the substantive crimes that … serve[d] as the 
racketeering predicates,” the District Court dismissed them.  
United States v. Bergrin, 707 F. Supp. 2d 503, 511 (D.N.J. 
2010).  The government appealed that decision and we 
reversed, observing that the concerns of the District Court 
were “either endemic to RICO prosecutions or involve[d] the 
application of irrelevant legal standards.”  United States v. 
Bergrin, 650 F.3d 257, 274 (3d Cir. 2011).   
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After remand, the government filed a 33-count second 
superseding indictment (the “Indictment”) charging Bergrin 
with RICO violations, witness tampering, participating in a 
cocaine-trafficking conspiracy, and tax evasion.  Two of the 
Indictment’s witness-tampering counts charge Bergrin for his 
role in facilitating the murder of a man named Kemo McCray 
(“Kemo”),1 who was to have been a witness against one of 
Bergrin’s clients.2
 
  The District Court ordered those counts 
(the “Kemo Murder Counts”) to be severed and tried first and 
separately from the rest of the crimes charged.  At the ensuing 
trial, the Court precluded the government from introducing 
evidence of two other witness-murder plots to prove 
Bergrin’s intent to have Kemo murdered, and the jury was 
ultimately unable to reach a verdict.   
As soon as the jury was dismissed, the government, in 
anticipation of a retrial, asked whether the District Court 
would adhere to its earlier evidentiary rulings.  “Absolutely,” 
was the response, though the Court noted that the government 
would be permitted to try to “convince [the Court] 
otherwise.”  (Joint App. at 49.)  The government now appeals 
those evidentiary rulings and also asks us to review an 
                                              
1 For ease of reference, we will refer to Mr. McCray by 
his first name, intending no undue familiarity or disrespect. 
2 Specifically, Count 12 charges Bergrin with 
conspiring to murder Kemo to prevent his testimony in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(k), and Count 13 charges that 
Bergrin “knowingly and intentionally … counsel[ed], and 
induce[d] others to kill” Kemo with “malice aforethought and 
with intent to prevent” his testimony in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1512(a)(1)(A).  (Joint App. at 199.) 
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additional severance order that the Court entered.3
 
  In 
addition, the government urges that the case be reassigned to 
a new judge, contending that a reasonable person would 
conclude that the District Court’s impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned. 
We will vacate the District Court’s decision with 
respect to one of the challenged evidentiary rulings, and, 
because we will direct the Chief Judge of the District Court to 
reassign this matter, will leave the other issues presented to be 
considered afresh by the judge who will take up the case. 
 
I. Factual Background and Procedural History 
 
A. Facts 
 
Centered around RICO counts that are substantially 
similar to the ones we held to be validly pleaded the last time 
this case was before us, see Bergrin, 650 F.3d at 261-63 
(summarizing the RICO charges), the Indictment accuses 
Bergrin of misusing his law practice to traffic drugs, facilitate 
prostitution, tamper with witnesses, and evade taxes.  Three 
different instances of witness tampering, all of which are 
alleged in the RICO violation charged in Count 1, are relevant 
to this appeal.  Specifically, Bergrin is charged with 
                                              
3 After the government took its appeal with respect to 
the evidentiary decisions pertaining to the Kemo Murder 
Counts, the Court severed the majority of the Indictment’s 
remaining substantive counts and ordered that they be tried 
before the rest of the charges.  The government appealed that 
ruling, too, see infra note 20, and we consolidated the 
government’s two appeals for disposition. 
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instigating Kemo’s murder, plotting to kill witnesses in 
connection with the legal defense of an individual named 
Vicente Esteves (the “Esteves Plot”), and plotting to kill a 
witness who planned to testify against a client named Richard 
Pozo (the “Pozo Plot”).4  Counts 2 through 4 of the 
Indictment also plead RICO violations relating to some or all 
of those three instances of witness tampering,5
 
 while the 
Indictment’s remaining counts charge Bergrin with other 
substantive or conspiracy offenses that rest on many of the 
allegations set forth in the RICO counts. 
1. The Kemo Murder 
 
                                              
4 Although the three witness-tampering plots are all 
alleged in Count 1, only the Kemo murder and the Esteves 
Plot are charged as predicate racketeering acts.  The Pozo 
Plot, by contrast, is listed as one of the “methods and means” 
through which Bergrin’s firm engaged in racketeering. 
5 Count 2 charges Bergrin with participating in a RICO 
conspiracy and alleges that the Kemo murder, the Esteves 
Plot, and the Pozo Plot were overt acts in furtherance of the 
conspiracy.  Counts 3 and 4 charge violent crimes in aid of 
racketeering offenses for Bergrin’s involvement in the Kemo 
murder and the Esteves Plot, respectively.  See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1959(a) (providing for criminal sanction where “[one] 
murders, kidnaps, maims, assaults with a dangerous weapon, 
commits assault resulting in serious bodily injury upon, or 
threatens to commit a crime of violence against any 
individual in violation of the laws of any State or the United 
States, or attempts or conspires so to do” in connection with a 
racketeering activity).   
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The Kemo Murder Counts were the subject of the trial 
that ultimately led to the present appeal, and, as charged, they 
carry a mandatory life sentence.6
 
  See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1512(a)(3)(A) (tampering with a witness by killing is 
punishable as “provided in sections 1111 and 1112”); id. § 
1512(k) (“Whoever conspires to commit any offense under 
this section shall be subject to the same penalties as those 
prescribed for the offense the commission of which was the 
object of the conspiracy.”); id. § 1111(b) (“Whoever is guilty 
of murder in the first degree shall be punished by death or by 
imprisonment for life.”).  
At the trial on those counts, the government introduced 
evidence that Kemo’s murder arose out of Bergrin’s 
representation of William Baskerville.  Baskerville was an 
associate in a drug-trafficking organization run by Hakeem 
Curry and was arrested on federal drug charges in November 
2003 for drug sales he made to Kemo.  Baskerville told 
Bergrin that he suspected Kemo to be the likely source of the 
government’s evidence against him.  Bergrin, in turn, 
telephoned Curry and told him that Kemo was the 
confidential witness against Baskerville.   
                                              
6 The violent crimes in aid of racketeering offense 
pertaining to the Kemo murder, see supra note 5, also carries 
a mandatory life sentence, see 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(1) (violent 
crimes in aid of racketeering that result in murder are 
punished “by death or life imprisonment, or a fine …, or 
both”); United States v. Carson, 455 F.3d 336, 385 n.44 (D.C. 
Cir. 2006) (reaching the “common sense conclusion” that, 
despite the language employed, the violent crimes in aid of 
racketeering statute “does not permit a fine to be levied in lieu 
of imprisonment or death”). 
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Anthony Young, a member of Curry’s organization 
and the government’s key witness at the trial of the Kemo 
Murder Counts,7
Members of Curry’s organization thereafter discussed 
how to find and kill Kemo, and, in March of 2004, Young 
found Kemo and shot him to death.   
 was with Curry during that conversation and 
overheard Bergrin say that “Kamo” was the confidential 
witness against Baskerville.  Young realized, however, that 
Bergrin was referring to Kemo.  According to Young, Bergrin 
met with him and other Curry organization members 
approximately one week after Baskerville’s arrest.  At that 
meeting, Bergrin told the group that “if Kemo testif[ied] 
against [Baskerville], [Baskerville] w[ould] never see the 
streets again” (Joint App. at 2528), but that he could “get 
[Baskerville] out if Kemo d[id]n’t testify” (id. at 2529).  
Bergrin twice reiterated “No Kemo, no case” and emphasized 
that the group should not “let that kid testify against 
[Baskerville].”  (Id.)   
                                              
7 Young was not the only witness who offered 
testimony incriminating Bergrin in Kemo’s murder.  Alberto 
Castro, a drug dealer, testified that Bergrin offered him 
$10,000 to murder Kemo, and two former confidants of 
Bergrin’s testified that Bergrin implied his complicity in the 
events that led to Kemo’s death.  (See Joint App. at 3409 
(testimony that Bergrin expressed his worry that “Baskerville 
would implicate him in the Kemo case”); id. at 3781 
(testimony that Bergrin stated he had “met with Baskerville’s 
people at the office,” “told them the name of the [witness],” 
and that they had “killed [the witness] three months later”).) 
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2. The Other Murder Plots 
 
The government also sought to prove Kemo’s murder 
using evidence of the Pozo Plot and the Esteves Plot, which 
the District Court ultimately precluded after considering 
evidentiary proffers.   
 
The government’s first effort to rely on those other 
murder plots developed pretrial when, after we ruled that the 
RICO counts had been wrongly dismissed and remanded the 
case, Bergrin filed a motion under Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 14 to sever the Kemo Murder Counts from the 
Indictment.8  Bergrin argued that a trial on every offense in 
the Indictment would be unfairly prejudicial.  The 
government disagreed, contending that severing the Kemo 
Murder Counts “would be a waste of judicial resources, … 
would present increased danger for witnesses, and that 
regardless of the severance plan … all or most of the evidence 
of the related crimes would be admissible at … [any] of the 
severed trials.”  (Id. at 57-58.)  It proffered, in that regard, 
that it would seek to prove the Kemo Murder Counts in part 
by relying on evidence of the Pozo Plot and the Esteves Plot 
under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).9
                                              
8 We refer to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
simply as “Criminal Rules.”  Criminal Rule 14(a) provides 
that a “court may order separate trials of counts, sever the 
defendants’ trials, or provide any other relief that justice 
requires” when joinder “appears to prejudice a defendant or 
the government.”  Fed. R. Crim. P. 14(a). 
   
9 We refer to the Federal Rules of Evidence simply as 
“Rules.”  Rule 404(b), as we discuss further infra, provides 
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i. The Pozo Plot 
 
Pozo, the government asserted, was a “large scale drug 
trafficker who distributed multi-hundred kilogram shipments 
of cocaine he received in New Jersey via Texas.”  (D.N.J. 
ECF no. 09-369, doc. no. 304-1, at 13.)10
ii. The Esteves Plot 
  In February 2004, 
he was charged in the Western District of Texas for his role in 
that drug distribution scheme, and he hired Bergrin to 
represent him.  Bergrin determined that Pozo’s co-defendant, 
Pedro Ramos, was cooperating with the government against 
Pozo.  He told Pozo that Ramos was an informant, asked him 
if he knew where Ramos lived, and told him that, if “we 
could get to [Ramos] and take him out, Pozo’s headache (his 
drug charges) would go away.”  (D.N.J. ECF no. 09-369, doc. 
no. 302,  at 1 (internal quotation marks omitted).)  Pozo 
responded, “Are you nuts?  I am not involved in murdering 
people,” and later retained new counsel.  (Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted).)  
 
                                                                                                     
that although “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act” is 
inadmissible to prove a person acted “in accordance with [his 
or her] character,” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1), it may be admitted 
for “another purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of 
mistake, or lack of accident,” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). 
10 Our references to documents on the District Court’s 
docket cite to the pagination contained in the ECF-generated 
header on each page. 
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Esteves, too, was a former client of Bergrin’s who 
“operated a large scale drug trafficking business based in 
New Jersey.”  (D.N.J. ECF no. 09-369, doc. no. 304-1, at 23.)  
He was prepared to testify that, when he met with Bergrin in 
May 2008, after being charged in the Superior Court of New 
Jersey with drug trafficking, Bergrin told him that “the only 
way to beat the case was if [Esteves] took care of the 
witnesses” on a list of those Bergrin believed were 
cooperating with the government.  (Id.)  During that 
conversation, Bergrin also told Esteves that he “hate[d] rats 
and … would kill a rat himself,” that “this was not the first 
time he ha[d] done this,” and that, “if there are no witnesses, 
there is no case.”  (Id.)  An informant named Oscar Cordova, 
whom Bergrin believed was a hitman, subsequently recorded 
Bergrin instructing him to kill a witness on that list.  (Id.; see 
Joint App. at 225-28 (describing the plot).)  In that 
conversation, Bergrin stated, “we gotta make it look like a 
robbery.  It cannot under any circumstances look like a hit. …  
We have to make it look like a home invasion robbery.”  
(D.N.J. ECF no. 09-369, doc. no. 304-5, at 3.) 
 
B. Procedural History 
 
1. The First Severance 
In a September 21, 2011 opinion (the “First Severance 
Opinion”) citing those proffers, the District Court decided 
that severance was necessary and ordered that the Kemo 
Murder Counts be tried first.   
 
The Court did say, however, that it would “likely allow 
certain … Rule 404(b) evidence into the separate trial on the 
[Kemo Murder] Counts.”  (Joint App. at 58.)  In particular, it 
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indicated that evidence of the Pozo Plot would be admissible 
because that plot occurred “before or around the same time as 
the [Kemo] murder conspiracy.”  (Id. at 59.)  Evidence of the 
Esteves Plot, by contrast, troubled the Court.  The Esteves 
Plot was unlike the “other-crime evidence most typically 
admitted under Rule 404(b),” the Court said, because it 
pertained to acts that “happened more than four years after 
the [Kemo] murder conspiracy” and was therefore evidence 
of a “subsequent criminal act.”  (Id.)  Although the Court 
acknowledged that there was no categorical “bar to 
subsequent act evidence,” it observed that “evidence of a 
subsequent act” is not necessarily “permissible or relevant in 
the same way that evidence of a prior bad act may be.”  (Id.)   
 
Nevertheless, the Court seemed to take for granted that 
the government would be permitted to use Bergrin’s own 
admissions to Esteves in proving the Kemo Murder Counts.  
(See id. at 62 (suggesting that certain evidence pertaining to 
the Esteves Plot would “likely be admissible to provide the 
requisite background information to support” the testimony of 
the witnesses, including Esteves, who would testify to 
Bergrin’s admissions).)  Aside from that, however, the Court 
made it clear that most of the proffered evidence pertaining to 
the Esteves Plot would be inadmissible in a trial on the Kemo 
Murder Counts.  The Court was particularly concerned about 
the tape recording of Bergrin’s conversation with Cordova, 
evidently believing that the tape’s probative value was likely 
to be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice: 
 
The Government proffers that it will introduce 
evidence, including audio recordings, showing 
that in 2008 Bergrin had conversations with a 
12 
 
confidential informant – dubbed by the 
Government as “the Hitman” – during which 
Bergrin explicitly discussed killing [a witness] 
and instructed the Hitman to make the murder 
look like a home invasion robbery.  By contrast, 
the Government’s proffered evidence regarding 
the [Kemo] murder is much more 
circumstantial.  The Government intends to 
prove that Bergrin said the words “no Kemo, no 
case” to certain other persons and that by 
uttering these words Bergrin specifically 
intended to cause those individuals to murder 
[Kemo] to keep him from testifying.  And 
although the Government has a variety of 
evidence specifically probative of the [Kemo 
Murder] Counts it intends to introduce, the 
evidence will likely be nowhere near as 
overwhelming as the evidence relating to the 
[Esteves Plot]. 
 
…. 
 
[I]n considering Bergrin’s guilt for the 
[Kemo Murder] Counts, any limiting 
instructions would likely be insufficient.  It 
would be perhaps unavoidable – and merely 
human – for the jury to use the direct, explicit 
evidence from the [Esteves Plot] murder 
conspiracy case to infer Bergrin’s guilt of the 
[Kemo Murder] Counts regardless of any 
limiting instruction. 
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(Id. at 56.)  Because Bergrin faced a life sentence on the 
Kemo Murder Counts, the Court found that risk to be 
particularly unacceptable.  (See id. at 57 (“[A]lthough he is 
charged with a variety of crimes, the stakes on the [Kemo 
Murder] Counts are especially high for Bergrin: if a jury finds 
him guilty on those counts, he faces a mandatory life 
sentence.”).)   
 
Thus, based in part on its view that evidence of the 
other witness-murder plots would not, despite the 
government’s argument, necessarily be admissible in a trial 
on the Kemo Murder Counts, the Court severed those counts 
from the Indictment and ordered them to be tried first.   
 
2. The Government’s Motion to Admit Rule 
404(b) Evidence and the District Court’s 
Initial Ruling 
On September 29, 2011, the government moved to 
admit much of the Rule 404(b) evidence it had set forth in its 
prior proffer, asking the Court to make “preliminary, pretrial 
rulings on the admissibility of [the] other acts evidence” that 
the Court’s First Severance Opinion had suggested would be 
admissible in a trial on the Kemo Murder Counts.  (D.N.J. 
ECF no. 09-369, doc. no. 304-2, at 3.)  Among other things, 
the government sought admission of Pozo’s testimony about 
the Pozo Plot, and Esteves’s testimony as to Bergrin’s 
statements during the Esteves Plot.11
                                              
11 Although the government implied that it was not 
asking to introduce Bergrin’s recorded statement to Cordova 
because of the Court’s ruling in the First Severance Opinion, 
the government noted that “Bergrin’s defense strategy 
  At an October 7, 2011 
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hearing four days before jury selection was scheduled to 
begin, the government followed up on the status of its Rule 
404(b) motion, “requesting that the Court make at least some 
preliminary rulings … certainly before the jury is sworn.”12
 
  
(Joint App. at 584-85.)  The Court did not do so, however, 
and a jury was empaneled on October 13, 2011.   
The next day, the Court announced its ruling on the 
government’s motion which was memorialized in an undated 
and unfiled opinion “handed to the parties the following 
week.”13
 
  (D.N.J. ECF no. 09-369, doc. no. 304, at 7.)  
Highlighting the factual similarities between the Pozo Plot 
and the Kemo murder, the Court ruled that the government 
would be permitted to introduce Pozo’s testimony under Rule 
404(b): 
                                                                                                     
[would] likely … open the door to additional Rule 404(b) 
evidence.”  (D.N.J. ECF no. 09-369, doc. no. 304-2, at 3.)  
12 As the government explained to the Court, such a 
ruling would permit it to “properly prepare an opening 
statement” and “properly prepare [witnesses] so that they 
don’t say something that’s inadmissible.”  (Joint App. at 584-
85.)  What was unsaid but perhaps implicit was that the 
swearing in of a jury would cut off the government’s right 
under 18 U.S.C. § 3731 to an immediate appeal of an adverse 
evidentiary ruling.   
13 Although it was attached as an exhibit to a motion 
for reconsideration the government subsequently filed, the 
Court’s Rule 404(b) opinion remains unfiled on the District 
Court’s docket. 
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[E]vidence of the [Pozo Plot] … is admissible 
under Rule 404(b).  The Government seeks to 
admit evidence that around February 2004, 
while Bergrin was acting as [Pozo’s] lawyer in 
a drug-trafficking case in federal court, Bergrin 
provided [Pozo] with the identity of a 
government witness against him, and counseled 
[Pozo] that if the witnesses were killed, Bergrin 
would win [Pozo’s] case.  The factual 
similarities of this case are so striking, and it is 
so close in time – occurring contemporaneously 
with the [Kemo] murder conspiracy – that this 
evidence is highly probative of Bergrin’s intent 
with respect to the charged conduct.  And while 
it carries a risk of undue prejudice, that 
prejudice is insufficient to substantially 
outweigh its high probative value.  And the 
Court will, again, mitigate the risk of prejudice 
by providing a proper limiting instruction. 
 
(Joint App. at 10 (internal citations omitted).)   
 
The Court, however, retreated from its previous 
suggestion that it would allow the government to introduce 
some of the evidence pertaining to the Esteves Plot.  It ruled 
instead that no such evidence – including the “admissions 
themselves” – would be allowed “under Rule 404(b) because 
the potential for prejudice far outweigh[ed that evidence’s] 
minimal probative value.”  (Id. at 13.)  As the Court 
explained it, the admissions were minimally probative 
because they were made in connection with a subsequent, as 
opposed to a prior, crime and were therefore too attenuated 
from the Kemo murder: 
16 
 
 
In its [First Severance Opinion], this Court 
expressed at length its concerns regarding the 
minimal probative value of – and the undue risk 
of prejudice pose[d] by – this subsequent crime 
evidence.  And while the Court previously 
indicated its willingness to consider allowing a 
limited amount of evidence to provide the 
necessary context as to these admissions, this 
no longer seems appropriate now that the Court 
has a better understanding of those admissions.  
The admissions that Bergrin allegedly made are 
too vague to be of great probative value – 
indeed, Bergrin does not mention the [Kemo] 
murder specifically, but alludes in general terms 
to some past act of indeterminate nature.  And 
they, like the other evidence of the [Esteves 
Plot] … are potentially unduly prejudicial.  If 
the admissions were admitted, the Government 
would also be entitled to introduce additional 
evidence regarding the [Esteves Plot], thereby 
compounding the risk of prejudice.  And, as 
discussed previously, the potential prejudice of 
evidence regarding the murder conspiracy with 
Estevez [sic] is so great that it threatens to 
prevent the jury from making a proper 
determination of Bergrin’s guilt for the [Kemo] 
murder – an untenable result, in light of this 
Court’s previous rulings. 
(Id. (internal citation omitted).)   
 
3. Bergrin’s Opening Statement 
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Opening statements began on October 17, 2011.  
Proceeding pro se with standby counsel, Bergrin told the jury 
that the evidence would prove he “never wanted, … never 
expected, …never believed … that one hair on Kemo’s head 
would be hurt.”  (Id. at 648.)  Instead, as he explained to the 
jury, he had simply acted as a zealous advocate on 
Baskerville’s behalf: “[W]hen I represented – was called … 
to represent William Baskerville, who was accused of a 
criminal offense, the Sixth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution said that I had to represent him, that he deserved 
to be represented effectively.  And that’s all I ever did in this 
case.”  (Id.)  Thus, although Bergrin acknowledged calling 
Curry and informing him that Kemo was the confidential 
witness, he characterized that call as part of his legal duty to 
represent Baskerville and denied any malicious motives.14
 
   
Bergrin spoke similarly in explaining the Pozo Plot to 
the jury, stating: 
 
Let me tell you about the facts of 
Richard Pozo which will come out in this case.  
Richard Pozo was dealing cocaine.  He sent a 
car with a bunch of cocaine in it from Elizabeth, 
… where he was living, to Texas.  The car 
began to be investigated.  The car was dropped 
off in the driveway of somebody’s house.  
While the car is being investigated, Richard 
                                              
14 Correspondingly, Bergrin claimed during the course 
of trial that he never participated in a meeting with Curry-
organization members in which he allegedly implied that 
Kemo should be killed by saying, among other things, “No 
Kemo, no case.”   
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Pozo comes to see me and says: I think I have a 
problem.  I believe they detected cocaine in a 
car that I had sent to Texas.  Will you represent 
me? 
 
There is no informant involved.  We 
have absolutely … no idea whatsoever who any 
informants are.  The name Pedro Ramon 
doesn’t even fit into the equation.  We have no 
clue who the informant is, he has no clue who 
any informant is.  And I question him in front of 
Peter Willis and another outstanding attorney by 
the name of John Whipple in Texas, and that’s 
borne out here in this particular case.  I never 
say to [Pozo]: Let’s get rid of the informant.  
Because what does it matter?  It doesn’t matter.  
I would never say that because it has no impact, 
has no effect and I would never say that to this 
type of individual. 
 
(Id. at 691-92.)   
 
Believing that Bergrin had made “various door-
opening assertions during his opening statement” the 
government filed a letter-motion the next day, asking the 
District Court to reconsider its evidentiary ruling excluding 
the Esteves Plot evidence.15
                                              
15 More specifically, the government argued that 
Bergrin “exploited [the] Court’s [evidentiary] rulings, and 
abused his status as a pro se litigant, by testifying in his 
opening statement.”  (D.N.J. ECF no. 09-369, doc. no. 263, at 
  (D.N.J. ECF no. 09-369, doc. no. 
263, at 1.)  The Court declined. 
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4. The District Court’s Decision to Exclude 
  Evidence of the Pozo Plot 
 Worse yet for the government, on November 8, 2011, 
the Court reversed course on the admissibility of Pozo’s 
testimony.  Acknowledging that it had previously “indicate[d] 
that that testimony would be admissible under [Rule] 404(b),” 
the Court said it had changed its mind, “after hearing the case 
and the context in which [the testimony was] now being 
offered.”  (Joint App. at 19.)  The Court described a three-
step process for considering whether to admit evidence under 
Rule 404(b): first, to “decide whether there is sufficient 
evidence that the other act in question actually occurred”; 
second, to assess “whether the evidence of other acts is 
probative of the material issue other than character”; and 
third, to consider “whether the probative value of the 
evidence is substantially outweighed by its potential 
prejudicial effect.”  (Id.)   
 
Pozo’s testimony, the Court said, was problematic 
under the first step of that procedure, because there was no 
independent documentation corroborating the substance of his 
intended testimony: 
                                                                                                     
2.)  And because it believed that Bergrin had brought his 
intent into question, the government asked the Court to allow 
it to introduce, among other things, Esteves’s testimony so as 
to rebut Bergrin’s “blanket, self-serving assertion” that he 
would never say “[l]et’s get rid of the informant … to … a 
client facing charges because of a cooperating witness.”  (Id. 
at 5 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).)   
20 
 
 
The first step is very rarely even an 
issue. …  [It] is almost typically a prior 
conviction.  It will be evidence of even a prior 
arrest which has some independen[t] 
corroboration because police make a prior arrest 
and then they seek to offer that type of 
evidence.  It might even be a wiretap. 
…. 
 
One of the concerns I have, and I’ve had, 
is that we’re talking about conversations which 
allegedly occurred many years ago, and we’re 
talking about people’s best recollections of that 
conversation without it having been recorded, 
without it having been documented 
immediately.  
 
…. 
 
We have that in this case already.  We 
have this case, one of the biggest contentions in 
this case is if the statement “No Kemo, no case” 
was made, what exactly does that mean. 
 
And the conversation with Mr. Pozo, I 
know the Government will say that’s Mr. 
Pozo’s best recollection.  But there’s nothing to 
document – when we’re talking about parsing 
such important words, there’s nothing to 
document what actually was spoken at that time 
in those few little sentences that the 
Government contends would show that Mr. 
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Bergrin was attempting [to] … you know, to 
murder the witness. 
 
(Id. at 19-21.)   
 
The Court suggested that its concern about whether 
Pozo’s testimony was truthful also played a role in assessing 
whether, under the third step, the probative value of the 
evidence was substantially outweighed by “its potential 
prejudicial effect.”  (Id. at 19.)  And the Court declared 
Pozo’s testimony would be “cumulative,” “collateral,” and 
“confusing.”  It explained: 
 
I have no sense of confidence that this evidence 
would be so reliable that its probative value 
would outweigh its prejudicial effect.  And I 
think, you know, there’s a concern that it would 
be considered by this jury as propensity versus 
really going to intent.   
 
 Now, in that context, let me also say, one 
of the considerations is, is there other evidence 
of intent in this case? 
 
 And, you know, you have other 
evidence, so this would be cumulative and very 
collateral and very confusing, in this Court’s 
opinion.  
 
…. 
 
[Y]ou have evidence of intent, you have, 
if the jury believes Mr. Young, you have the 
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conversation that Mr. Young testified to …, 
which is a very specific conversation that he 
says he recalls Mr. Bergrin making at that time 
back in 2004, shortly after … Mr. Baskerville’s 
arrest.  He testified at … some length about that 
conversation.  So you have evidence of what 
“No Kemo, no case” means.  
 
 You also have the evidence that you 
brought forth about Mr. Castro.  You brought 
forth evidence that Mr. Bergrin went to … 
another motivated witness, … which the jury 
will have to consider in which he says, Mr. 
Bergrin went to him at some point and said, you 
know: I’ll give you $10,000 if you would, you 
know, kill this guy. 
 
 Mr. Pozo would be another witness, a 
drug dealer who is claiming at some point some 
conversation occurred.  It’s not documented.  
And in weighing the factors that I need to weigh 
as far as, you know, the minimum degree it will 
have with respect to intent, because the jury 
would have to parse those words, whatever they 
finally conclude were the words, first of all, 
because there’s nothing to document other than 
Mr. Pozo saying what he remembers, and then 
on cross it may come out to … be something 
else, they’d have to document those – they’d 
have to parse those words along with the “No 
Kemo, no case.”  And I think their challenge as 
far as dealing with “No Kemo, no case” is 
enough. 
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(Id. at 23-26.)   
 
That evening, the government filed a motion asking 
the Court to reconsider its decision to exclude evidence of the 
Pozo Plot and the Esteves Plot.  As the government argued 
the next morning in support of its motion, one might perceive 
“an inherent tension” between the ruling that the Pozo Plot 
was based on “insufficient proof … because we don’t have a 
tape” and the ruling that the Esteves Plot was too prejudicial 
“because we do have a tape.”  (Id. at 36, 37.)  The District 
Court was not persuaded, however, and reaffirmed its 
rulings.16
5. Closing Arguments and the Jury’s  
  Verdict 
 
At a subsequent conference about jury instructions, 
Bergrin successfully requested that the jury be told it “is a 
defense to the charges in the Indictment that the defendant’s 
acts constituted lawful and legitimate legal representation of a 
client.”  (D.N.J. ECF doc. no. 09-369, no. 327, at 46; see Joint 
App. at 4024-25 (Bergrin’s request).)  Then, in summation, he 
                                              
16 As to the Esteves Plot, the Court stated that if “there 
was a conviction [in Bergrin’s case], I would believe … that 
that conviction was the result of the Esteves evidence, 
because I don’t see how [the jury] could humanly put that out 
of their mind.”  (Joint App. at 38.)  As to the Pozo Plot, the 
Court again laid out its fear that “the jury would … have to 
parse out what exactly did Mr. Bergrin say … according to 
Mr. Pozo’s recollections eight months after the incident” 
given that “we’re talking about a drug dealer, and hearing 
words that he thought.”  (Id. at 39.) 
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echoed his opening statement’s assertion that he was being 
“accused for doing [his] job,” to “defend the Constitution [by] 
mak[ing] sure that [Baskerville] ha[d] effective 
representation.”  (Joint App. at 4188.)  Indeed, while Bergrin 
again acknowledged that he had discussed Kemo’s name with 
Baskerville and disclosed it to Curry over the phone, he 
attributed his behavior to legitimate representation, and 
implored the jury not to conclude “under any circumstance, 
under any leap of bound and faith that [he] ever intended for 
one hair to be hurt on poor Kemo’s head.”  (Id. at 4277; 
accord id. at 4194 (“I, under no circumstances, ever intended, 
ever wanted, ever told, ever warned, ever advised, ever 
informed anyone to ever harm a hair on the head of Kemo 
McCray.  I never had that intent.”).)   
 
After six days of deliberation, the jury was unable to 
reach a verdict.  As a result, the Court declared a mistrial on 
November 23, 2011, and scheduled a retrial on the Kemo 
Murder Counts for January 2012.   
 
6. The Government’s Appeal and Efforts to 
Determine Which Counts to Try Next 
Shortly thereafter, the government inquired “about 
rulings that [the Court] made excluding evidence,” asking the 
Court to clarify if it was “going to adhere to those; Pozo and 
Esteves and the things that were contained in the … 404(b) 
ruling.”  (Id. at 49.)  The Court responded as follows: 
“Absolutely.  I don’t see – unless you can convince me 
otherwise, as to why those rulings – I know you feel 
otherwise – but on reflection I feel strongly that those rulings 
were appropriate.  So I don’t expect I would be changing 
those rulings.”  (Id. at 49-50.)  On November 30, 2011, the 
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government filed a notice of appeal challenging those 
evidentiary rulings.17
 
   
The next day, the government moved to try the 
remainder of the counts in the Indictment at the January 2012 
retrial, though it stated it would be willing to sever the tax 
evasion counts upon Bergrin’s request.  The Court held a 
hearing on December 8, 2011 to consider which counts to try 
next.  Bergrin appeared at the hearing and asked the Court to 
stay proceedings pending our disposition of the government’s 
appeal of the evidentiary rulings.  After consulting with the 
government, the Court suggested a second severance in which 
the drug-trafficking counts and the witness-tampering counts 
pertaining to the Esteves Plot would be severed and tried 
before the rest of the Indictment.18
 
  The government declined 
the Court’s suggestion, however, prompting Bergrin to file a 
severance motion.   
 At an ensuing hearing on December 14, 2011, the 
government again requested that it be permitted to try the 
                                              
17 As discussed infra in Part II.A, the government 
invoked 18 U.S.C. § 3731 as the basis for appellate 
jurisdiction.  
18 Under that proposal, Count 5 of the Indictment – 
which charges a drug-trafficking conspiracy and lists the 
Kemo murder, the Pozo Plot, and the Esteves Plot as part of 
the conspiracy’s “manner and means” – would have been 
altered to delete allegations relating to the Kemo murder so 
that “the Government [would be precluded] from introducing 
any such evidence.”  (D.N.J. ECF no. 09-369, doc. no. 352, at 
1.)   
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entirety of its case against Bergrin, because “[t]he Kemo 
murder and the Esteves thing [were] not [disconnected] 
bookends” but rather were charged as “a racketeering RICO 
violation because” that was what they were.  (Id. at 4436.)  
The Court, however, made clear that it would not accept the 
government’s request to “go forward with the Kemo 
allegations … in the” RICO counts: 
 
The concern I always had and the reason I 
severed out [the Kemo Murder Counts] was 
because of what I believed, and still do believe 
– and I think, frankly, the result of the jury 
being hung reflects what I had a concern about 
– is that charge, standing alone, for the reasons I 
stated in the severance, I always was concerned 
about the prejudice there would have been if [it] 
would have been tried with Esteves and all of 
the drug evidence that occurred subsequently.  
And I still feel the jury wouldn’t have been able 
to separate that out and decide the Kemo case 
just based on that case and the prior crime 
evidence that this Court didn’t let in.  
 
(Id. at 4433.)  Trying the RICO counts next, the Court said, 
would unfairly expose Bergrin to a potential life sentence: 
The Court: … [I]n my opinion it would 
have been inherently unfair to have him 
convicted under a RICO – the way that was 
framed for the murder case facing a life in 
prison sentence tried that way.  That’s how I felt 
and I still feel that way.  And yet, you still feel 
insistent on that’s a fair trial, he should be 
facing that kind of penalty on the Kemo part of 
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the case when you already now saw a jury come 
back and couldn’t reach a verdict on that.   
 
Sure, if you get all your other evidence 
in he’ll get convicted on the Kemo murder part 
of the case and, you know, that’s what you 
want. 
 
[Government’s Counsel]: Well, Judge –  
 
The Court: And that’s the way you want 
to do it, and that’s what I have a real difference 
of opinion with. 
 
[Government’s Counsel]: I understand. 
 
The Court: And the Government, you 
know, they can charge a ham sandwich.  I know 
that; you know that. 
 
So if you charge a RICO case on its face 
on the indictment, it doesn’t take a whole lot to 
charge a RICO case. 
(Id. at 4463-64.)  Given that, in the Court’s view, the 
government’s case on the charges other than the Kemo 
Murder Counts and the related RICO counts was “very 
strong,”19
                                              
19 The Court opined that, aside from the Kemo Murder 
Counts, the government had a “very clean, strong case,” with 
witnesses “more credible than Anthony Young and Castro 
type witnesses.”  (Joint App. at 4461.) 
 that it could be proven without the witnesses who 
28 
 
had testified in the trial on the Kemo Murder Counts, and that 
it would warrant a “sentence that would reflect the severity of 
[those other charges],” the Court suggested that the 
government should not “spend the taxpayers’ money to come 
in here, put on [the Kemo Murder Counts] evidence again, 
[and] stand behind those kinds of witnesses again when [the 
government did not] have to do it.”  (Id. at 4460.)   
 
In response to those concerns, the government invited 
the Court to dismiss the RICO counts if it believed “that Mr. 
Bergrin [could not] get a fair trial … as presently 
constituted.”  (Id. at 4458.)  The Court, however, refused to 
dismiss the Indictment’s RICO counts, stating that it had 
already “[done] that once … because at the time I still was 
concerned about the RICO allegations, quite frankly, mostly 
for the same reason.”  (Id.) 
 
7. The Second Severance 
Instead, on December 27, 2011, the Court severed the 
substantive counts charging Bergrin with drug trafficking and 
participating in the Esteves Plot from the rest of the counts in 
the Indictment, and ordered that they be tried in January 2012 
(the “Second Severance Order”).  The Court explained that its 
“original premise [was] that trying Bergrin for his alleged 
involvement in the [Kemo] murder conspiracy with extensive 
evidence from the [Esteves Plot] … would be fundamentally 
unfair and improper” (id. at 67), and it went on to say that the 
concerns memorialized in its First Severance Opinion 
required an additional severance, because the government’s 
appeal with respect to the Kemo Murder Counts made it 
“impossible” to pursue the “most logical solution” of simply 
retrying those counts (id. at 69).   
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Severing the Indictment’s drug-trafficking and Esteves 
Plot counts was the next best solution, the Court said, since 
such a severance would 
 
avoid[] undue prejudice because Bergrin faces 
no exposure for his alleged involvement in the 
[Kemo] murder conspiracy, and so the jury 
cannot find him guilty of those charges based 
on improper spillover evidence.  It also 
incorporates as many of the remaining counts as 
may properly be joined, and, if Bergrin is 
convicted, carries a substantial penalty which 
should satisfy the Government’s desire for 
justice. 
 
(Id. at 73.)  The Court also ruled that it was necessary to 
ensure that those counts were tried before the RICO counts in 
which the Kemo murder and the Esteves Plot were intrinsic, 
rejecting the government’s statement that it should be 
permitted to proceed on its RICO charges first, and 
characterizing that position as a “thinly veiled attempt to 
either circumvent [the Court’s] prior decision or discourage 
the Court from taking further actions required by justice.”  
(Id.)   
 
That same day, the government filed a second notice 
of appeal, this time challenging the Second Severance Order.   
 
II. Discussion 
 The government argues that the District Court abused 
its discretion by precluding the introduction of evidence of 
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the Pozo Plot and the Esteves Plot in the retrial on the Kemo 
Murder Counts, and in ordering the drug-trafficking and 
Esteves Plot counts to be severed.  It also contends that this 
case should be reassigned to another district judge.  Bergrin 
of course disagrees, but spends the bulk of his efforts arguing 
that we lack jurisdiction to entertain any of the government’s 
arguments.   
 
We begin by addressing the jurisdictional issue. 
 
A. Jurisdiction 
  
The District Court had jurisdiction over this case under 
18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We, in turn, have appellate jurisdiction to 
consider challenges to “decision[s] or order[s] of a district 
court suppressing or excluding evidence …, not made after 
the defendant has been put in jeopardy,” so long as the 
“United States attorney certifies to the district court that the 
appeal is not taken for purpose of delay and that the evidence 
is a substantial proof of a fact material in the proceeding.”  18 
U.S.C. § 3731.  The government’s appeal from the District 
Court’s ruling excluding evidence of the Pozo Plot and the 
Esteves Plot invokes that jurisdiction on the ground that the 
District Court’s verbal statement that it would “[a]bsolutely” 
adhere to its prior rulings on retrial (Joint App. at 49) was an 
appealable “decision or order” excluding evidence.   
 
Given § 3731’s express mandate that its provisions 
“shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes,” 18 
U.S.C. § 3731, there is wide agreement that oral decisions 
dealing with subjects within the statute’s scope are 
appealable.  See United States v. Farnsworth, 456 F.3d 394, 
398-99 (3d Cir. 2006) (presuming an “oral ruling” is 
31 
 
appealable under § 3731, but holding the ruling at issue was 
not appealable because it was not, as the government 
contended, a dismissal); United States v. Janati, 374 F.3d 
263, 269 (4th Cir. 2004) (exercising appellate jurisdiction 
over an “oral ruling”); United States v. Presser, 844 F.2d 
1275, 1280 (6th Cir. 1988) (“[W]e view the district court’s 
oral statement as evidencing an intent to exclude government 
evidence … and consequently, its statement qualifies as an 
appealable order … .”); United States v. Flores, 538 F.2d 939, 
942-43 (2d Cir. 1976) (oral ruling “exclud[ing] evidence of 
prior acts and statements” was appealable under § 3731).  
Bergrin argues, however, that the District Court’s statement 
was not sufficiently definite to constitute an appealable 
decision or order, because the District Court was not 
unequivocal in saying it would exclude evidence of the Pozo 
Plot and the Esteves Plot at Bergrin’s retrial.  Cf. United 
States v. Brooks, 145 F.3d 446, 453-54 (1st Cir. 1998) (stating 
that orders lacking a requisite “degree of finality … may not 
qualify as … order[s] excluding evidence under section 
3731”).  The record belies that claim. 
 
Although the Court’s colloquy did include some 
qualifying language, the first thing it said was that it would 
“[a]bsolutely” exclude that evidence from Bergrin’s retrial.  
(Joint App. at 49.)  And it further stated that it “fe[lt] strongly 
that [its] rulings were appropriate.”  (Id.)  The Court’s rulings 
over the course of Bergrin’s trial on the Kemo Murder Counts 
reflect similarly strong convictions, even amidst repeated 
requests by the government to introduce the Pozo Plot and the 
Esteves Plot evidence after Bergrin denied any intent to harm 
Kemo.  Moreover, the Court confirmed its resolve to keep out 
the questioned evidence when, at a hearing after the 
government’s first appeal was filed, it reiterated that 
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excluding the evidence was “the right decision” (id. at 4446), 
and subsequently ordered a second severance based on its 
belief “that trying Bergrin for his alleged involvement in the 
[Kemo] murder conspiracy with extensive evidence from the 
[Esteves Plot] … would be fundamentally unfair and 
improper” (id. at 67).   
 
The District Court did, to be sure, leave open the 
possibility that it would reconsider its evidentiary 
determinations, and it is possible, as Bergrin points out, that 
circumstances may change in the future.  But the chance of 
change is inherent in virtually every pretrial evidentiary 
ruling and treating such rulings as unreviewable “would 
insulate [them] from appellate review, thus frustrating … the 
purposes of § 3731.”  United States v. Siegel, 536 F.3d 306, 
315 (4th Cir. 2008).  Indeed, even a district court’s explicit 
suggestion that a ruling is “preliminary and could change” 
does not make it an unappealable one under § 3731.  Id. at 
314; cf. United States v. Horwitz, 622 F.2d 1101, 1104 (2d 
Cir. 1980) (stating that even “conditional … ruling[s], which 
raise[] the remote prospect that suppression will not be 
ordered, [do not] necessarily deprive[] [an appellate] court of 
jurisdiction under section 3731”).  Thus, while there was 
perhaps some “ambiguity about the district court’s future 
actions,” its statement clearly “evidenc[ed] an intent to 
exclude government evidence” at Bergrin’s retrial, Presser, 
844 F.2d at 1280, and thereby laid the foundation for our 
jurisdiction under § 3731.   
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We turn, then, to consider the government’s challenge 
to the merits of those evidentiary rulings.20
                                              
20 Although we can undoubtedly review the District 
Court’s second severance to determine whether it warrants 
mandamus relief, since the government has alternatively 
petitioned for that writ, see United States v. Santtini, 963 F.2d 
585, 590 (3d Cir. 1992) (“[P]arties are free to proceed 
alternatively on application for a writ or by appeal, with the 
court determining which, if any, procedure is more 
appropriate.”), the jurisdictional question presented by the 
appeal of the Second Severance Order is more difficult.  The 
government argues that we have pendent appellate 
jurisdiction to consider that appeal based on our § 3731 
jurisdiction to consider the District Court’s evidentiary 
rulings.  We have “recognized ‘a discretionary, though 
‘narrow,’ doctrine of pendent appellate jurisdiction,’” E.I. 
DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Rhone Poulenc Fiber & Resin 
Intermediates, S.A.S., 269 F.3d 187, 204 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(citation omitted), but there is a split in authority as to 
whether that doctrine applies in criminal cases and we have 
not expressly employed it in that context, compare, e.g., 
United States v. Ferguson, 246 F.3d 129, 138 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(“[T]here is no pendent appellate jurisdiction in criminal 
cases.” (citing Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 662-63 
(1977))), with United States v. Lopez-Lukis, 102 F.3d 1164, 
1167 & n.10 (11th Cir. 1997) (exercising pendent appellate 
jurisdiction over an order striking a count from an indictment 
where the government appealed an order suppressing 
evidence under § 3731), and United States v. Maker, 751 F.2d 
614, 626 (3d Cir. 1984) (reviewing a severance order for an 
abuse of discretion without explicitly relying on, or referring 
to, pendent appellate jurisdiction).  Because we will require 
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B. The District Court’s Exclusion of Pozo’s  
  Testimony21
Before trial, the District Court had ruled that the 
government would be permitted under Rule 404(b) to 
introduce Pozo’s testimony that Bergrin counseled him to 
murder a witness.  As the Court noted at that time, “[t]he 
factual similarities” between that incident and the Kemo 
murder are “striking,” and the “evidence is highly probative 
of Bergrin’s intent with respect to [the Kemo murder].”  
(Joint App. at 10.)  Although the Court thought the admission 
of that testimony “carrie[d] a risk of undue prejudice,” it 
concluded “that [the] prejudice [was] insufficient to 
substantially outweigh its high probative value” and noted 
that it would “mitigate the risk of prejudice by providing a 
proper limiting instruction.”  (Id.)  At trial, however, even 
after Bergrin told the jury in his opening statement that he 
would not have made the statements to which Pozo would 
testify and declared that he had been acting legitimately as an 
attorney in representing Baskerville, the Court turned about 
and ruled that the evidence was inadmissible.  We agree with 
the government that the reasons given for that change reflect 
an abuse of discretion.   
 
 
                                                                                                     
this case to be reassigned and will ask that the severance 
rulings be revisited, see infra Part II.C, we need not determine 
the propriety of the Second Severance Order and therefore do 
not decide whether we have appellate jurisdiction to review it. 
21 We review a “district court’s decision regarding the 
admissibility of evidence … for abuse of discretion.”  United 
States v. Higdon, 638 F.3d 233, 238 (3d Cir. 2011). 
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Rule 404(b), as we have noted, provides that 
“[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible 
to prove a person’s character in order to show that … the 
person acted in accordance with the character,” Fed. R. Evid. 
404(b)(1), but the Rule permits such evidence “for another 
purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or 
lack of accident,” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2).  To be admissible 
under Rule 404(b), then, evidence of uncharged crimes or 
wrongs must have a proper evidentiary purpose.  “A proper 
purpose is one that is ‘probative of a material issue other than 
character.’”  United States v. Green, 617 F.3d 233, 250 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (quoting Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 
681, 686 (1988)); see United States v. Johnson, 199 F.3d 123, 
128 (3d Cir. 1999) (stating that Rule 404(b) evidence is 
proper “if relevant for any other purpose than to show a mere 
propensity or disposition on the part of the defendant to 
commit the crime” (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  As long as evidence offered under Rule 404(b) 
satisfies that criterion, we favor its admission.  Johnson, 199 
F.3d at 128.  Of course, such evidence may be excluded if “its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of … 
unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, 
undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting 
cumulative evidence.”   Fed. R. Evid. 403.  We have also 
emphasized that limiting instructions may be appropriate 
when admitting Rule 404(b) evidence.  See Green, 617 F.3d 
at 249 (noting that a limiting instruction should be given 
where requested). 
 
1. The Decision That There Was 
Insufficient Evidence to Establish That 
Pozo’s Testimony Was Truthful 
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As the District Court correctly explained, one step in 
evaluating whether to admit Rule 404(b) evidence is to 
determine whether there is sufficient evidence to conclude 
that the crime, wrong, or other act in question actually 
occurred, because “similar act evidence is relevant only if … 
the act occurred and … the defendant was the actor.”  
Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 689.  Applying that inquiry to Pozo’s 
proffered testimony, however, the Court made its own 
credibility assessment, saying that there was “nothing to 
document what actually was spoken at that time in those few 
little sentences that the Government contends would show 
that Mr. Bergrin was attempting [to] … you know, to murder 
the witness.”  (Joint App. at 21.)  Owing to the lack of 
independent corroboration, the Court decided that “Mr. 
Pozo’s best recollection” would not suffice.  (Id.)  That was 
an error of law.   
 
In Huddleston v. United States, the Supreme Court 
expressly rejected the “level of judicial oversight” that the 
District Court applied here in excluding Pozo’s testimony.  
485 U.S. at 688.  It said, rather, that Rule 404(b) evidence 
need only be supported by sufficient evidence for a jury to be 
able to “reasonably conclude that the act occurred and that the 
defendant was the actor.”  Id. at 689.  A court’s task in that 
regard is simply to decide, in accordance with Rule 104(b), 
“whether the jury could reasonably find th[ose] facts … by a 
preponderance of the evidence.”22
                                              
22 Thus, although the standard of proof in criminal 
cases requires a greater showing than a preponderance of 
proof, evidence of a contested fact may be admissible towards 
that greater burden when the “evidence in the case” permits a 
  Id. at 690; see Fed. R. 
37 
 
Evid. 104(b) (“When the relevance of evidence depends on 
whether a fact exists, proof must be introduced sufficient to 
support a finding that the fact does exist.”).  Importantly, the 
Supreme Court instructed that, in making that determination, 
trial courts must not “weigh[] credibility” or “make[] a 
finding.”  Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 690.     
 
By discounting Pozo’s testimony based on a lack of 
corroboration and questions about credibility, the Court 
usurped the jury’s role.  See United States v. Dillon, 532 F.3d 
379, 391 (5th Cir. 2008) (“Rule 104(b) does not require 
corroboration.  It only requires that the district court consider 
the witness’s testimony and determine that a reasonable jury 
could [make the required] find[ing] by a preponderance of the 
evidence … .” (internal footnote omitted)); Siegel, 536 F.3d 
at 319 (“Evidence is [sufficiently] reliable for purposes of 
Rule 404(b) ‘unless it is so preposterous that it could not be 
believed by a rational and properly instructed juror.’” 
(citation omitted)); cf. United States v. Haut, 107 F.3d 213, 
220 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting that it “is a basic tenet of the jury 
system that it is improper for a district court to substitute[ ] 
[its] judgment of the facts and the credibility of the witnesses 
for that of the jury” (alteration in original) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted)).  While Pozo’s credibility 
and motivation for testifying may be open to question, his 
testimony itself was sufficient to permit a jury to reasonably 
conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Bergrin 
did the things that Pozo said he did.  See United States v. 
Bailey, 990 F.2d 119, 123 (4th Cir. 1993) (explaining that a 
witness’s testimony should not be precluded “simply because 
                                                                                                     
jury to “reasonably find the … fact … by a preponderance of 
the evidence.”  Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 690. 
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it is in conflict with or contradicted by other testimony” or is 
offered by a “witness [who] has an unsavory past,” as those 
“are merely circumstances for the jury to consider”).   
 
Consequently, the Court was obliged to permit a jury 
to consider that testimony, provided it was otherwise 
admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. 
 
2. The Finding That Pozo’s Testimony Was 
Substantially More Prejudicial Than 
Probative 
The District Court did not believe that Pozo’s 
testimony was otherwise admissible, because, under Rule 
403, the Court determined that the testimony was cumulative 
and confusing, and that the prejudice from it substantially 
outweighed any probative value.  All of those conclusions are 
problematic.   
 
To begin with, it is not clear that the Court applied the 
proper test under Rule 403, because, at times, it spoke simply 
in terms of “prejudice” to Bergrin.  (Joint App. at 23.)  It must 
always be remembered that unfair prejudice is what Rule 403 
is meant to guard against, that is, prejudice “based on 
something other than [the evidence’s] persuasive weight.”  
United States v. Cruz-Garcia, 344 F.3d 951, 956 (9th Cir. 
2003); see United States v. Starnes, 583 F.3d 196, 215 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (“[U]nfair prejudice does not simply mean damage 
to the opponent’s cause.” (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted)).  Assuming the Court was using the term 
“prejudice” as shorthand for “unfair prejudice,” we are 
examining the kind of balancing decision to which we would 
ordinarily accord great deference.  See United States v. 
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Kellogg, 510 F.3d 188, 197 (3d Cir. 2007) (noting that if 
“judicial self-restraint is ever desirable, it is when a Rule 403 
analysis of a trial court is reviewed by an appellate tribunal” 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).  In general, a 
Rule 403 decision will not be reversed unless the “analysis 
[undertaken] and resulting conclusion” is “arbitrary or 
irrational.”  Id.  (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Here, unfortunately, the District Court’s Rule 403 
analysis was arbitrary, in that it was based on the same legally 
flawed credibility determination that led the Court to 
conclude that Pozo’s testimony was inadmissible without 
independent corroboration. 
 
Pozo, as the District Court saw it, “would be another 
witness, a drug dealer who is claiming at some point some 
conversation occurred.”  (Joint App. at 25.)  Assessing his 
proffered testimony in that light, the Court characterized it as 
having a “minimum degree [of persuasiveness] … with 
respect to intent.”  (Id.)  An assumption about how the jury 
would view Pozo’s credibility was, however, an improper 
basis for discounting his testimony’s probative value.  See 
United States v. Welsh, 774 F.2d 670, 672 (4th Cir. 1986) 
(“[A]s a general rule, the credibility of a witness has nothing 
to do with whether or not his testimony is probative with 
respect to the fact which it seeks to prove.”); 22 Charles Alan 
Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 5214 (4th ed. 1996) (“[I]t seems relatively clear 
that in the weighing process under Rule 403 the judge cannot 
consider the credibility of witnesses.”).  And that errant 
starting point likewise tainted the Court’s conclusion that the 
jury would be confused by Pozo’s testimony indicating that 
Bergrin told him to “take out” a cooperating witness.  The 
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only possible confusion, if it can be called that, would arise 
from discrediting the source of the testimony.23
 
   
Stripped of improper credibility assessments, Pozo’s 
proffered testimony is – as the District Court initially 
observed when saying it would be admissible – highly 
probative of Bergrin’s guilt, because the factual similarities 
between the Pozo Plot and the Kemo murder truly are 
“striking.”  (Joint App. at 10.)  Pozo was a drug dealer 
represented by Bergrin around the same time as the Kemo 
murder, and he was prepared to testify that Bergrin suggested 
that he kill a witness.  Pozo’s testimony is, therefore, 
powerfully suggestive of Bergrin’s intent in passing Kemo’s 
identity on from Baskerville to Curry.  It is likewise relevant 
to deciding whether Bergrin uttered the words “No Kemo, no 
case,” and, if he did, what he meant.24
                                              
23 Nor was the testimony, as the District Court 
suggested, cumulative.  After all, the Court itself recognized 
that the credibility of the primary witnesses against Bergrin 
on the Kemo Murder Counts is open to question.  See supra 
note 
   
19.  Pozo’s testimony would therefore have added much 
“to the probative force of the other evidence in the case,” and 
“contribut[ed] to the determination of truth,” United States v. 
Williams, 81 F.3d 1434, 1443 (7th Cir. 1996), and so it cannot 
properly be said to be “cumulative,” United States v. Brown, 
597 F.3d 399, 406 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (stating evidence should 
only be deemed “cumulative” when the “evidence on one side 
is so full that no jury that rejected it would be likely to change 
its mind because of the introduction of the proffered 
evidence” (citation omitted)).  
24 The District Court itself recognized that intent was a 
key issue in the case in its colloquy excluding Pozo’s 
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In sum, we conclude that the District Court’s ruling 
excluding Pozo’s testimony cannot “be reconciled with a 
sound exercise of discretion,” United States v. Gatto, 924 
F.2d 491, 501 (3d Cir. 1991), and, accordingly, must be 
vacated.25
                                                                                                     
testimony under Rule 403.  (See Joint App. at 20-21 (“[O]ne 
of the biggest contentions in this case is if the statement ‘No 
Kemo, no case’ was made, what exactly does that mean.”).)  
But Bergrin argues that his intent is not at issue with respect 
to the Kemo Murder Counts, because his primary defense is 
that he never attended the meeting in which he allegedly said 
“No Kemo, no case.”  We disagree.  Bergrin’s insistence that 
he did not say those words does not mean the jury will not 
have to consider them.  It is for the jury to decide whether he 
said them.  Moreover, as we have just noted, the question of 
Bergrin’s intent is not only relevant to determining what “No 
Kemo, no case” may mean, but also to ascertaining Bergrin’s 
purpose in telling Curry who the witness against Baskerville 
was.     
   
25 Pozo’s proffered testimony was proper Rule 404(b) 
evidence, and, as we have made plain, our review of the 
record thus far reveals no sound basis upon which it should 
have been precluded from the government’s case on the 
Kemo Murder Counts under Rule 403.  We nevertheless leave 
it to the new judge to whom this case will be assigned to 
conduct his or her own balancing under Rule 403 if the 
government again seeks to prove the Kemo Murder Counts 
using evidence of the Pozo Plot. 
With respect to the Esteves Plot, we agree with the 
government that the District Court observed an unwarranted 
42 
 
                                                                                                     
analytical distinction between a “prior bad act” and a 
“subsequent bad act,” reasoning that the latter “looks more 
like evidence that is being offered to show that the accused is 
a ‘bad guy,’ someone with the propensity to commit criminal 
acts.”  (Joint App. at 60.)  Rule 404(b) refers to evidence of 
crimes, wrongs, or other acts, saying nothing about whether 
the act in question is a “prior” or “subsequent” act.  That 
makes sense because light can be shed on motive, intent, and 
the other issues listed in Rule 404(b)(2) as much by a 
subsequent course of behavior as it can by a prior one.  Cf. 
Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 686 (referring to “similar acts 
evidence under Rule 404(b)” (emphasis added)).  So although 
we once questioned, in dicta “[t]he logic of showing prior 
intent or knowledge by proof of subsequent activity,” United 
States v. Boyd, 595 F.2d 120, 126 (3d Cir. 1978), the District 
Court erred to the extent it dismissed the probative value of 
subsequent act evidence.  See United States v. McGilberry, 
620 F.3d 880, 886 (8th Cir. 2010) (“Rule 404(b) draw[s] no 
distinction between prior and subsequent acts that would 
support different analyses … .” (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Rutkoske, 506 
F.3d 170, 177 (2d Cir. 2007) (“The courts of appeals mostly 
agree that the admission of subsequent acts under Rule 404(b) 
is governed by the same four-part test as prior acts … .”); 
United States v. Mohr, 318 F.3d 613, 617 (4th Cir. 2003) 
(“Rule 404(b) … covers evidence of both prior and 
subsequent acts.”); United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 
1283 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he standard for evaluating the 
admissibility of a subsequent bad act under Rule 404(b) is 
identical to that for determining whether a prior bad act 
should be admitted under this Rule.”); United States v. 
Echeverri, 854 F.2d 638, 645 (3d Cir. 1988) (“We do not 
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dispute that there may be cases in which evidence of 
subsequent wrongful acts may properly be admitted under 
Rule 404(b)”); United States v. Alker, 260 F.2d 135, 157 (3d 
Cir. 1958) (stating that “prior and subsequent acts … 
substantially similar to the subject matter forming the basis of 
the indictment [that] are probative to negate the inference that 
the crucial conduct was … innocent”). 
Unlike the District Court’s ruling with respect to the 
Pozo Plot, however, the District Court’s decision to exclude 
evidence of the Esteves Plot was not clearly rooted in a 
flawed premise.  Indeed, the Court spoke at length about its 
concerns regarding the nature of the Esteves Plot evidence, 
(see, e.g., Joint App. at 38 (explaining that if “there was a 
conviction, I would believe … that that conviction was the 
result of the Esteves evidence, because I don’t see how they 
could humanly put that out of their mind and the purposes of 
the cautionary instruction would be and then weigh the rest of 
this case accordingly”)), and we cannot glean whether or not 
its Rule 403 balancing was tainted by the mistaken distinction 
it drew between subsequent and prior acts.  Thus, it is 
difficult to tell whether or not the Court’s judgment is entitled 
to the deference ordinarily accorded a Rule 403 decision.  See 
Kellogg, 510 F.3d at 197 (stating the general maxim that 
“judicial self-restraint” is desirable “when a Rule 403 analysis 
of a trial court is reviewed” (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted)).  However, because we will be reassigning 
this case and directing the new district judge to determine 
afresh the admissibility of the Esteves Plot evidence, see infra 
Part II.C, we need not tackle the issue at this juncture.  It 
suffices to say that, in considering that issue on remand, the 
judge should bear in mind that subsequent act evidence may 
be properly admitted under Rule 404(b), although Rule 403 
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C. Reassignment 
 The government also asks that this case be given to 
another district judge, and we agree, reluctantly, that 
reassignment is appropriate.  Our authority to direct the 
reassignment of a case on remand is based on 28 U.S.C. § 
455(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 2106.  United States v. Bertoli, 40 
F.3d 1384, 1411 (3d Cir. 1994).  Under § 455(a), a judge 
should no longer preside over a case when “a reasonable 
person, with knowledge of all the facts, would conclude that 
the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”26
                                                                                                     
permits exclusion when the probative value of such evidence 
is “substantially outweighed by a danger of … unfair 
prejudice,” see Fed. R. Evid. 403, which, again, refers to 
prejudice “based on something other than [the evidence’s] 
persuasive weight.”  Cruz-Garcia, 344 F.3d at 956.   
  
United States v. Wecht, 484 F.3d 194, 213 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  To warrant 
reassignment under § 455(a), a case generally must involve 
apparent bias deriving from an extrajudicial source,  meaning 
All of this, of course, becomes essentially moot if the 
new judge disagrees with the approach to severance that had 
been followed here, though a limiting instruction might still 
be warranted with respect to the jury’s consideration of the 
Pozo Plot and the Esteves Plot in connection with the Kemo 
Murder Counts. 
26 “[T]he hypothetical reasonable person … must be 
someone outside the judicial system because judicial insiders 
… may regard asserted conflicts to be more innocuous than 
an outsider would.”  In re Kensington Int’l Ltd., 368 F.3d 
289, 303 (3d Cir. 2004).   
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something above and beyond judicial rulings or opinions 
formed in presiding over the case.  See Liteky v. United 
States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (noting that “judicial rulings 
alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or 
partiality motion [under § 455(a)]” since they rarely 
“evidence the degree of favoritism or antagonism required … 
when no extrajudicial source is involved”).  Our supervisory 
powers under § 2106, however, also permit reassignment and 
are not necessarily constrained by that limitation.  See id. at 
554 (noting that “[f]ederal appellate courts’ ability to assign a 
case to a different judge on remand rests not on the recusal 
statutes alone, but on the appellate courts’ statutory power” 
under § 2106 which “may permit a different standard” than 
that applicable to § 455(a)).  Notwithstanding the potential 
differences between the standards for reassignment under 
§ 455(a) and § 2106, we have typically reviewed requests for 
reassignment under § 2106  “under an ‘appearance of 
impartiality’ standard” like that applicable in the § 455(a) 
context.  Bertoli, 40 F.3d at 1414 (citation omitted); see Gov’t 
of the V.I. v. Walker, 261 F.3d 370, 376 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(exercising the supervisory power to reassign a case because 
the “conduct and comments of the trial judge … ma[d]e it 
exceedingly difficult to resurrect an appearance of 
impartiality”). 
 
Although reassignment is an extraordinary remedy that 
should seldom be employed, see United States v. Higdon, 638 
F.3d 233, 248 (3d Cir. 2011) (recognizing that reassignment 
should “be considered seriously and made only rarely” 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), we conclude 
that it is appropriate in this case despite our sincere respect 
for the District Judge who has presided to this point.  Key to 
our decision is the District Court’s repeated expressions of 
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discomfort with the manner in which the Indictment pulls the 
various criminal acts, including the witness-tampering plots, 
together under the umbrella of RICO charges.  That 
discomfort manifested itself when the Court entered its first 
dismissal of the RICO counts.  While the Court pointed to 
what may be called “equitable or logistical concerns,” 
Bergrin, 650 F.3d at 274, in examining “the sufficiency of the 
[then-existing indictment’s] allegations” under Criminal Rule 
12, Bergrin, 707 F. Supp. 2d at 509, it was not explicit about 
how prominent a role those concerns played in its decision.  It 
now appears that the Court ruled as it did, at least in part, 
because it believes that it is impossible for Bergrin to get a 
fair trial on the RICO counts due to the very nature of RICO, 
allowing, as it does, for multiple criminal acts to be charged 
as a pattern of racketeering activity.27
The Court expressed that same fear when, after the 
government appealed the evidentiary rulings relating to the 
Kemo Murder Counts, it balked at the government’s request 
to try the RICO counts.  In suggesting that a trial of those 
  (See Joint App. at 4458 
(the Court’s answer, in response to the government’s 
invitation to dismiss the RICO counts if the Court believed 
they could not be fairly tried, that “I did that once … because 
at the time I still was concerned about the RICO allegations, 
quite frankly, mostly for the same reason”).)  
                                              
27 We recognize that the District Court’s primary 
concern here was that Kemo’s murder, for which Bergrin 
faces a potential life sentence, is an integral component of the 
Indictment’s RICO counts.  See supra note 6.  We do not 
intend to suggest that, in different circumstances, there would 
be hostility to trying RICO counts simply because they allow 
the government to address multiple criminal acts in one 
charge. 
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counts would be a fundamentally unfair and inefficient use of 
prosecutorial resources, the Court said: 
 
And now you’re sitting here saying: 
Judge, we want to do it that way.  We’re going 
to bring back these guys and we’re going to 
spend all this taxpayers’ money, all these people 
in witness protection, they’re going to come 
flying in, coming in, we’re going to go through 
all of this, when you have an option.  You have 
an option of a five to seven-week trial, clean, 
probably a conviction if the evidence is what I 
see it is.  I mean, you know, and yet you’re 
insisting on trying to prove an enterprise, a 
pattern, all these predicate acts, confusing a 
jury, bringing in these guys again, and he’ll be 
cross-examining them again.  For what?  
 
(Id. at 4461-62.)   
 
To mitigate that perceived inequity, and in an apparent 
effort to dissuade the government from seeking to try the 
RICO counts, the Court tried to assure the government that 
“there would be a sentence that would reflect the severity of” 
the Indictment’s other charges if it secured a conviction on 
those charges.  (Joint App. at 4460.)  In that same colloquy, 
the Court did not dispute the government’s assertion that the 
Court had “all but accused [the prosecution of] having 
wrapped [the Kemo murder and the Esteves Plot] in the 
Indictment in order to prevent [Bergrin] from getting a fair 
trial” (id. at 4450), confirming instead that, in the Court’s 
view, it would indeed “have been inherently unfair to have 
[Bergrin] convicted under … RICO” (id. at 4463).  Most 
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recently, in ordering a second severance, the Court made clear 
its view that “trying Bergrin for his alleged involvement in 
the [Kemo] murder conspiracy with extensive evidence from 
the [Esteves Plot] … would be fundamentally unfair and 
improper.”  (Id. at 67.)   
 
The problem with that view is that presenting the 
witness-tampering allegations as part of a related pattern of 
racketeering activity is exactly what the Indictment and RICO 
allow.  The Indictment contains valid RICO charges which 
allege the Kemo murder along with the Esteves Plot and the 
Pozo Plot, and, if the government ever brings its RICO 
charges in this case to trial, it will necessarily introduce 
evidence of those murder plots to meet its burden of proof.  
We do not doubt the depth of the District Court’s 
commitment to ensuring a fair trial for all parties, and the 
Court’s concern for the rights of a criminal defendant is 
commendable.  But, as we have already held, Congress 
validly paved a path for prosecutions like the one charged in 
the Indictment.  See Bergrin, 650 F.3d at 276 (reversing the 
dismissal of substantially similar RICO counts).  It is not a 
court’s prerogative to construct a detour around RICO simply 
because the court is uncomfortable with how that statute may 
“significantly alter[] the way trials are conducted in cases that 
involve racketeering acts committed by members of an 
enterprise.”28
                                              
28 We do not mean to imply that a district court is 
powerless in a RICO case to consider severance orders.  On 
the contrary, as we said the first time we had this case, the 
District Court could appropriately “discuss[] joinder and 
severance under Rules 8 and 14 of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure” when presented with the former iteration 
  Id. at 275; see United States v. Vitillo, 490 F.3d 
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314, 320 (3d Cir. 2007) (“It is well-established that ‘[a]n 
indictment returned by a legally constituted and unbiased 
grand jury … if valid on its face, is enough to call for trial of 
the charge on the merits.” (alterations and emphasis in 
original) (quoting Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 
363 (1956))).   
 
Ultimately, in light of the District Court’s statements – 
both before and after the earlier appeal in this case – about a 
perceived unfairness in trying the various witness-tampering 
counts together, we believe that the Court’s “impartiality 
might reasonably be questioned,” Wecht, 484 F.3d at 226 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted), and will 
therefore order that this case be reassigned under § 2106, see 
Bertoli, 40 F.3d at 1414 (noting that supervisory power 
reassignment has typically been applied “under an 
‘appearance of impartiality’ standard” (citation omitted)).  
Because the Court’s discomfort with the Indictment may well 
have prompted its evidentiary and case management rulings 
(see Joint App. at 4458 (the Court’s statement that it initially 
dismissed the RICO counts “because at the time I still was 
                                                                                                     
of the Indictment.  Bergrin, 650 F.3d at 276.  That authority, 
of course, is not unyielding or unbounded, see United States 
v. Giannattasio, 979 F.2d 98, 100 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.) 
(rejecting a court’s direction to a prosecutor to “select five … 
counts for prosecution” of a fifteen count indictment and 
proceed to trial on those counts alone, and noting that “[a] 
judge in our system does not have the authority to tell 
prosecutors which crimes to prosecute or when to prosecute 
them”), but, as we have already noted, we need not and do not 
attempt to delineate its contours as applied to the severance 
orders entered in this case.  See supra note 20. 
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concerned about the RICO allegations, quite frankly, mostly 
for the same reason”)), we direct the judge to whom this case 
is reassigned to consider anew whether the Indictment should 
be severed in any respect and, as necessary, the extent to 
which evidence of the Esteves Plot and the Pozo Plot can 
properly be used to prove the government’s case against 
Bergrin on the Kemo Murder Counts.29
 
  See 28 U.S.C. § 2106 
(affording courts of appeals the authority to “require such 
further proceedings to be had as may be just under the 
circumstances”); cf. Rimbert v. Eli Lilly & Co., 647 F.3d 
1247, 1252 (10th Cir. 2011) (stating that the “law of the case 
doctrine has no bearing on the revisiting of interlocutory 
orders, even when a case has been reassigned from one judge 
to another”); Perez-Ruiz v. Crespo-Guillen, 25 F.3d 40, 42 
(1st Cir. 1994) (“Interlocutory orders … remain open to trial 
court reconsideration, and do not constitute the law of the 
case.”). 
III. Conclusion 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District 
Court’s decision to exclude evidence of the Pozo Plot and 
will direct the Chief Judge of the District Court to reassign 
this matter. 
                                              
29 Although we have vacated the District Court’s 
decision to exclude evidence of the Pozo Plot from Bergrin’s 
retrial, we note, again, that, depending on what is offered in 
evidence, the new judge may well be asked to determine the 
admissibility of the Pozo Plot evidence with respect to the 
Kemo Murder Counts and will, in that event, need to conduct 
an appropriate Rule 403 balancing.  See supra note 25. 
